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ARGUMENT 
I. THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS IN ERROR. 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56 (c) (emphasis added). The attorneys representing the Appellant Robert Stevens (hereinafter 
"Stevens") failed to respond to Appellee City of Laverkin's (hereinafter "City") Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Although Stevens failed to timely respond to City's motion, such failure 
to respond to City's motion does not entitle City to summary judgment by itself. City is not 
entitled to summary judgment because the facts in the Record before the trial court, even if 
undisputed, do not entitle City to a judgment as a matter of law. 
A. Steven's failure to timely respond to City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in and of itself does not entitle City to summary judgment. 
Without repeating Stevens' arguments presented in the Brief of Appellant, a party 
opposing summary judgment is not always required to proffer affidavits or other documents in 
order to avoid judgment against him. In Frisbee v. K & K Construction, 676 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that it is not always necessary to submit 
documents in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in order to avoid judgment (Id at 
390). The Frisbee Court held that "where the party opposed to the motion submits no 
documents in opposition, the moving party may be granted summary judgment only if 
appropriate, that is, if he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id (quoting Orwell v. Clark, 
658 P.2d 585, 596 (Utah 1982)). 
The Frisbee court continued, 
Where the moving affidavit shows on its face that there is a material issue of fact, 
summary judgment may not be entered, even if responsive affidavits are not filed. (fn8) 
In this case, Anderson is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. His affidavit and 
supporting documents presented conclusions with no supporting facts and show 
unresolved issues of fact. (Id at 390). 
In the present case, although Stevens failed to respond to City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff did not need to file a response to City's Motion for Summary Judgment in 
order to avoid summary judgment because summary judgment was inappropriate. See Id. Similar 
to die defendants supporting documents in Frisbee, the City's documents supporting its Motion 
for Summary Judgment only present conclusions without sufficientiy supporting facts. (See 
Record). 
B. Summary Judgment is not appropriate when based on conclusory 
statements that are unsupported by fact. 
Contrary to City's allegation, Stevens does not suggest that the trial court nor this Court 
search for any "scrap of evidence" from the record on Stevens' behalf. (Appellee's Br. at 22.) 
Quite simply, the same is unnecessary as City's documents supporting summary judgment on 
their face contain conclusory statements rather then statements of fact supporting such 
inferences. The following facts are the same "laundry list" of facts that City presented to the 
trial court. (Appellee's Br. at 25.) These facts are not only material, but they form the basis for 
the trial court's decision granting City summary judgment. 
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1. In regards to the Conditional Use Permit issued for the 160 South State 
Property, the City failed to identify any of the alleged conditions imposed 
nor which of the alleged conditions Stevens failed to comply with. 
In Paragraph 11 of the "Statement of Fact To Which No Genuine Issue Exists" section 
of City's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(the "Memorandum"), City states that on January 7, 2004, it issued a conditional use permit to 
Stevens for the use of the 160 South State Property. (R. 448). Pursuant to the record before the 
trial court, the only condition imposed upon Stevens at this time was to not have more than 20 
re-furbished cars. (R. 448) 
Subsequently, pursuant to Paragraph 13 of the Memorandum, on September 1,2004, the 
City approved the renewal of the conditional use permit, of which contained several conditions 
not included in the original conditional use permit issued on January 7,2004. (R. 448). Although 
the City states conditions were imposed, the City wholly failed to identify what conditions were 
actually imposed upon Stevens in this renewed conditional use permit. (R. 448). Pursuant to 
Paragraph 26 of the Memorandum, on June 1, 2005, the City then conducted a review hearing 
regarding Stevens' alleged non-compliance with these phantom conditions that were imposed 
at the September 1, 2004 hearing. (R. 450). 
Pursuant to Paragraph 27 of the Memorandum, on June 1, 2005, the City revoked or 
otherwise refused to renew the condition use permit based on Stevens alleged non-compliance 
of the imposed conditions. (R. 450). Nowhere in City's Memorandum does it state what 
conditions were imposed upon Stevens nor does it state which conditions Stevens failed to 
comply with of which formed the basis for its action of revoking or refusing to renew the 
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conditional use permit for the 160 South State Property.1 (R. 445-467). Pursuant to the record, 
even if Stevens had received notice of the appeal process and exercised such right, he would not 
have known to what he should be appealing. 
Summary Judgment was entered in favor of City based on the mere conclusory 
statements that Stevens was non-compliant with alleged conditions.2 However, no facts other 
than the conclusory statements were presented to the trial court to support such a conclusion. 
Thus, City's conclusory statements not only preclude judgment as a matter of law but do not 
create a genuine issue of fact. 
2. In regards to the Conditional Use Permit issued for the 95 South State 
Property, the City failed to identify any of the alleged conditions imposed 
nor which of the alleged conditions Stevens failed to comply with. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum, on January 5, 2000, Stevens was granted 
a conditional use permit and a business license to operate an auto body repair shop at the 95 
South State Property. (R. 447). In addition, Paragraph 5 also states that the conditional use 
permit did not include an expiration date nor did it contain any express conditions other than 
that sewer requirements be met. (R. 447). Shortly thereafter, Stevens operated his business 
without issue until approximately October 13, 2004.3 (R. 445-467). 
1
 Pursuant to the record, City has never alleged that Stevens was non-compliant with 
the condition of not having more than 20 refurbished cars on the 160 South State Property. 
2
 Such argument is presumed based on the fact that the trial court did not state upon 
which grounds it was granting summary judgment. (R. 445-467). 
3
 City has never alleged Stevens was non-compliant with the original condition of the 
sewer requirement. 
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Then, pursuant to Paragraph 16 of the Memorandum, on October 13, 2004, without 
notice to Stevens and without Stevens presence, of which will be discussed infra, City held a 
meeting wherein it discussed concerns regarding Stevens' use of the 95 South State Property. (R. 
448-449). Had it stopped there, City would have not violated its own city ordinances and such 
meeting would have fulfilled its intended purpose; to discuss planning commission concerns. 
However, die City did not stop there. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 17 of the Memorandum, in the October 13,2004, without Stevens 
being present, the City modified the conditional use permit that was issued to Stevens on January 
5,2000 for the use of the 95 South State Property. (R. 449). Such fact is supported by City's very 
next paragraph in the Memorandum. In Paragraph 18 of the Memorandum, on December 15, 
2004, City held a review hearing to discuss Stevens' alleged "failure to comply with certain 
conditions imposed at the October 13, 2004 meeting and certain conditions upon which the 
CUP was issued..."4 (R. 449). 
Not only did City fail to provide any evidence that Stevens was provided notice of the 
October 13, 2004 hearing nor was in attendance of the same, City failed to provide any factual 
support evidencing what new conditions were being imposed and expected of Stevens. (R. 445-
467). Besides not knowing what alleged new conditions were arbitrarily placed on the 95 South 
State Property, City failed to present any evidence to the trial court regarding which of these new 
conditions were not complied with. (R. 445-467). Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the 
4
 Pursuant to the record, until this point in time, the only condition imposed upon 
Stevens for his use of the 95 South State Property was that sewer requirements be met. (R. 
447). 
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Memorandum, the City only makes the conclusory statement that Stevens "failed to comply with 
certain conditions imposed at the October 13, 2004 meeting../5 (R. 449). 
Moreover, pursuant to Paragraph 20 of the Memorandum, City continued making 
conclusory statements by stating that the conditional use permit was farther modified by adding 
even more conditions that was eventually modified on January 7,2005. (R. 449). However, City 
again failed to present to the trial court what these alleged additional conditions were. (R. 445-
467). Then, pursuant to Paragraph 29 of the Memorandum, on August 17, 2005, City held 
another review hearing to consider revocation of the conditional use permit for the 95 South 
State Property based on Stevens' alleged non-compliance of the phantom conditions that were 
imposed at the January 5, 2005 hearing. (R. 451). 
Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of the Memorandum, City again makes conclusory statements 
that Stevens failed to comply with imposed conditions. (R. 451). Based on these vague 
allegations, City revoked the conditional use permit for the 95 South State Property. (R. 451). 
Summary Judgment was entered in favor of City based on the mere conclusory statements that 
Stevens was non-compliant with imposed conditions. However, no facts other then the 
conclusory statements were presented to the trial court to support such a conclusion. (R. 445-
467). Thus, City's conclusory statements not only preclude judgment as a matter of law but do 
not create a genuine issue of fact. 
These facts concerning the conditional use permits for the 106 South State Property and 
95 South State Property were undisputably before the trial court. (R. 445-467). As also 
referenced by City, the appellate court should only consider documents and evidence properly 
before the trial court on summary judgment. See Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 
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P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). (Appellee Br. at 26). The above list of facts are undisputed. The 
above listed facts are also conclusory statements. On its face, the Memorandum in support of 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment creates genuine issues of fact. City is not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the facts before the trial court because the facts simply 
do not support it. 
C. Summary Judgment was inappropriate as City's Memorandum in support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment on its face creates genuine issues of 
fact. 
Again, pursuant to Frisbee, "[w]here the moving affidavit shows on its face that there is 
a material issue of fact, summary judgment may not be entered, even if responsive affidavits are 
not filed." Frisbee at 390. See also Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). On the face of 
City's Memorandum, a genuine issue of fact was created when City failed to provide any facts 
to the trial court that the conditional use permit issued to Stevens for the 95 South State 
Property had been modified with notice to Stevens and where Stevens was present at such a 
hearing. (EL 445-467). 
Pursuant to Section 10-9-10 of the La Verkin City Ordinances, 
The city council may modify or revoke a conditional use permit, following notice and 
a hearing. A conditional use permit may be modified or revoked if the city council finds 
one or more of the following: 
A. The permit was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, 
B. The specific use for which the permit was granted is not being exercised; or 
C. Noncompliance with conditions imposed upon said use permit 
(Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the undisputed facts before the trial court show that on January 5, 
2000, Stevens received a conditional use permit for his 95 South State Property that had no 
expiration date and that was subject to only one condition; that sewer requirements be met. (R. 
447). Pursuant to the facts presented to the trial court, the 95 South State Property conditional 
use permit was never modified nor altered, nor was it even discussed, prior to October 13,2004. 
(R. 445-467) Then, pursuant to the undisputed record, on October 13, 2004, without notice 
or a hearing, the City held a Joint Work Meeting of the City Council and the Planning 
Commission wherein it arbitrarily and capriciously modified the 95 South State Property 
conditional use permit. (R. 448-449). 
Section 10-9-10 is explicit; a modification of a conditional use permitis proper only after 
notice and a hearing. Here, neither occurred. Make no mistake about it, instead of looking at 
this through rose color glasses as City would have us do, this case is essentially a grudge match 
between City and Stevens. Approximately one (1) month after the hearing wherein the City 
began imposing additional conditions on the 160 South State Property and wherein the 
atmosphere of the room was probably anything but amiable, the City arbitrarily and capriciously 
modified the 95 South State Property conditional use permit without notice and without a 
hearing. (R. 448-449). 
Whether such modification to impose conditions was warranted is irrelevant to the issue 
of whether notice and a hearing was required for such a modification. Pursuant to Section 10-9-
10 of the La Verkin City Ordinances, modification of a conditional use permit is only proper 
following notice and a hearing. Here, the document supporting City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its face created a genuine issue of fact. Pursuant to the facts presented to the trial 
court, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Stevens was provided with notice and a hearing 
prior to modifying the 95 South State Property conditional use permit. City's Memorandum 
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completely omits any factual evidence that Stevens was provided notice of the October 13,2004 
hearing nor that he was present at said hearing. (R. 445-467). 
This fact is material as the City's arbitrary action had a domino effect on the events of 
this case. Had City provided notice of the October 13, 2004 hearing, Stevens would have 
attended the hearing. Had Stevens attended the hearing, he would have known what conditions 
were being added to the conditional use permit. Had Stevens known what additional conditions 
were added, he could have complied with the additional conditions. Had Stevens complied with 
the additional conditions - of which he was unaware of - he would not have been in alleged 
violation of the conditions and he would not have had his business license revoked. 
Because City failed to provide facts showing that it provided Stevens with notice and a 
hearing regarding the modification of the 95 South State Property conditional use permit, City 
cannot turn around and blame Stevens for his non-compliance with such conditions. (R. 445-
467). On its face, the Memorandum in support of City's Motion for Summary Judgment creates 
a genuine issue of fact. Thus, the entry of summary judgment was improper and this Court 
should reverse the same. 
II. CITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
"Even if there is cno genuine issue as to any material fact/ a summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings and other documents demonstrate that the 'moving party is entided to a 
judgment as a matter of law."' Lockhart Co. v. Anderson. 646 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1982). Not 
only do the undisputed facts create genuine issues of fact on their face, but City's facts presented 
in support of summary judgment do not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. 
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A. The facts before the trial court are simply insufficient to grant summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
City failed to provide any evidence before the trial court substantiating its claim that 
Stevens had failed to comply with City imposed conditions for his conditional use permits. (R. 
445-467). Nowhere throughout City's documents supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment 
is there found a minutia of detail regarding which condition(s) Stevens failed to comply with and 
how Stevens failed to comply with such condition(s). (R. 445-467). City's failure to provide the 
trial court with any factual support as to such conclusory statements lends litde credence, if any, 
to City's allegations. 
ccWe have noted that summary judgment 'should be granted only when all the facts 
entitling the moving party to a judgment are clearly established or admitted.'" Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Sorenson v. Beers, 585 
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah 1978)). See also Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1990) 
("[Tjhere must exist undisputed facts in the evidence before the trial court relating to each of 
the elements of [the legal doctrine upon which the trial court rests its decision to grant summary 
judgment] in order for us to affirm the ruling."). Here, there are no facts by which this Court 
could affirm the ruling of the trial court other than mere conclusory statements that were left 
undisputed due to Stevens' excusable failure to respond to the same. (R. 445-467). 
B. The facts before the trial court on their face create unresolved and 
disputed questions of law. 
Stevens argues in his appellate brief that the facts before the trial court create questions 
of law diat are not fit to be answered through summary judgment. Amidst City's unwavering 
efforts to convince this Court that there are no undisputed facts, City has also recognized that 
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unanswered legal questions have arisen from the facis before the trial court. In City's brief, City 
states, "ft]he question of whether he had a right to appeal requires an interpretation of the laws 
and ordinances at issue. That is a legal question. So too is the question of whether City was 
required to walk Stevens through the appeal process." (Appellee Brief at 27). 
The issues of whether Stevens' conditional use permits were arbitrarily and capriciously 
modified and/or revoked by City, whether Stevens had a right to appeal City's actions and 
whether City had an obligation to inform Stevens of such right to appeal are material issues of 
this case. Neither Stevens nor City can agree as to the appropriate legal standard in answering 
these questions. These issues, as City's recognizes, are legal questions that are not appropriately 
determined through summary judgment; 
...summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts fall on two opposite ends of a 
factual continuum: either (i) when the facts are so clear that reasonable persons 
could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the application of the 
governing legal standard to the facts or (ii) when the facts underlying the allegation 
of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that they 
fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to concealment, with the result that the 
claim fails as a matter of law. (Emphasis added). 
See Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996). 
As the facts before the trial court create on their face genuine issues of fact and questions 
of law, of which the parties are unable to agree as to the correct legal standard in answering such 
questions, summary judgment was improper. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
granting City summary judgment to address the issues of fact and questions of law created by 
such facts. 
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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER AS STEVENS HAS A LEGALLY 
COGNIZABLE PROPERTY INTEREST IN HIS BUSINESS LICENSE THAT 
WAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY TAKEN FROM HIM BY CITY. 
Contrary to City's questionable assertion in its brief, Stevens not only claimed a property 
interest in his real properties, but he also claims a legally recognizable property interest in his 
business license. (Appellee Br. at 30). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits the States from "depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. As the facts before the trial court 
on their face show an arbitrary and capricious taking by City of Stevens5 business license in 
violation of Stevens' due process rights, summary judgment was not proper.5 (R. 445-467). 
A. At a very minimum, a genuine issue of fact and question of law has arisen 
as to whether Stevens5 due process rights were violated by the modification 
of the 95 South State Property conditional use permit and eventual 
revocation of Stevens' business license that precludes summary judgment,, 
The Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Utah courts have recognized that 
the term "property" denotes a broad range of interests. (Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n. 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982)). Under Utah law, Stevens has a legally 
recognizable interest in his business license. (See Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 589 P.2d at 1216 (holding that the licensing of a business represents a property 
interest, and should not be disrupted without following fundamental standards of due process 
5
 Such argument is not limited on appeal as the trial court failed to clarify on what 
grounds it based its ruling for summary judgment. The underlying documents creating this 
action are a Verified Complaint filed by Stevens and a Counterclaim filed by City. 
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of law) see also 58 Am Jur.2d Nuisances § 57 (1989) (notice and opportunity for hearing are 
generally required when government acts to terminate existing land use activity)). 
"To state a claim for a deprivation of due process, a party must allege three elements: (1) 
that through state action she was (2) deprived of a constitutionally recognized life, liberty, or 
property interest, (3) without an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." Millet v. Logan City; 2006 UT App 466, See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 
1; cf. Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). Quite plainly and simply, Stevens' due 
process rights were violated when City modified the 95 South State Property conditional use 
permit, of which eventually lead to the revocation of Stevens' business license, without notice 
and widiout a hearing. (R. 445-467). 
In response to City's argument that Stevens submitted no evidence to show a substantial 
interference abridging or destroying his claimed property right; frankly, he did not have to, City 
did it for him. (R. 445-467). City failed to present any evidence showing Stevens was provided 
notice of the October 13,2004 hearing wherein City modified the conditional use permit for the 
95 South State Property. (R. 445-467). Nor has City presented any evidence showing that 
Stevens was present at the October 13, 2004 hearing. (R. 445-467). The conditions imposed at 
the October 13,2004 hearing without Stevens being present were the same conditions on which 
City based Stevens' alleged non-compliance; of which ultimately lead to the revocation of 
Stevens' business license. At minimum, a genuine issue of fact and question of law has arisen 
as to whether such taking by the City is considered a violation of Stevens' due process rights. 
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B. Stevens did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies as he was not 
provided notice of the same. 
It is undisputed that Stevens was not provided notice of the October 13, 2004 hearing 
not was he present at said hearing (R 445-467) As Stevens was not provided any advance 
notice of the hearing wherein City modified the conditional use permit for the 95 South State 
Property and the newly added conditions, there is no way he could have known that (1) he had 
the right to appeal, or (2) whether he even should be appeahng anything in the first place If 
Stevens was not provided notice of the hearing, the question of whether Stevens would have 
known of the newly imposed conditions need not be answered 
Furthermore, Utah law guarantees that a party be given notice of his rights and any time 
limitations on these rights Worrall v Ogden City Fire Dep' t 616 P 2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) 
Although City goes to great lengths to distinguish Worrall it is good and binding case law In 
Worrall the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant city had violated plaintiffs procedural 
due process rights when it failed to give written notice to plaintiff of his right to appeal the city's 
decision to teimmate plaintiffs employment Id_ at 600-02 The Worrall Court stated that under 
the due process clause, the plaintiff was "entitled to have this essential information imparted to 
him, that he rmght make an intelligent and informed decision " Id_ 
As City points out, Worrall relies on Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co , 339 
U S 306 (1950), of which also remains good law (Appellee Br at 36) The Mullane court is 
useful to the case at hand as it "espouses a more straightfoward test of reasonableness under the 
circumstances" Dusenbery v United States. 534 US 161 (2002) Contrary to City's 
interpretation of Mullane's use by the United States Supreme Court, the Dunesbery court 
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continued, "[s]ince Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned to it when confronted with 
questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice Id. 
As referenced repeatedly in United States Supreme Court decisions, Mullane stands for 
the central idea that "[t]he right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that 
the matter [affecting one's property rights] is pending and can choose for himself whether to 
appear or default, acquiesce or contest" Mullane at 314. 
In the present case, in violation of Stevens' due process rights and in violation of the La 
Verkin City Ordinances, City wholly failed to provide Stevens with notice of the October 13, 
2004 hearing wherein it modified the conditional use permit for the 95 South State Property. (R. 
445-467) Moreover, pursuant to the facts before the trial court, it is undisputed that City failed 
to impart to Stevens any notice of his right to appeal the conditions imposed on the 106 South 
State Property or the conditions imposed on the 95 South State Property (R. 456). Pursuant to 
WorraUL Stevens was entitled to have this essential information imparted to him so that he might 
make an informed and intelligent decision as to whether to waive his constitutional right to a 
post-revocation hearing Cf Id City's failure to do so violated Stevens' due process rights 
City cites the case of City of West Covma v Perkins, 525 U S 234, 241 (1999) in 
opposition of Stevens'position (Appellee Br at 36) However, the facts of City of West Covina 
are distinguishable from the facts in this case In City of West Covina, Perkins claimed the city 
violated his due process rights when it, through the actions of its police officers acting on a 
warrant, confiscated personal property from Perkins without notice and a hearing. The City of 
West Covina court found that Perkins' due process rights had not been violated because the city 
had provided Perkins with reasonable notice of his remedies as the search warrant provided the 
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name of the issuing judge and court and the persons to be contacted for information regarding 
the return of his personal property. 
Here, Stevens was imparted no such information. (R. 456). Sure, Stevens was aware of 
the regulatory authority which had imposed the conditions, but he was unaware that he had a 
right to appeal the adverse decisions that were made. Had Stevens been provided a form with 
contact information, this case would be in line with City of West Covina. However, here, City 
imparted Stevens no information of his right to appeal, or any remedy for that matter. (R. 456). 
As stated in City of West Covina. "[a] primary purpose of the notice required by the Due 
Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a hearing is meaningful." Id. In City of 
West Covina, a form of notice was provided to Perkins and the U.S. Supreme Court did not see 
fit to require the city to provide additional forms of notice. Here, City failed to provide any 
form of notice to Stevens. (R. 445-467). To suggest that the ordinances and remedies lying 
therein are available to the public through the internet or available at the City's offices and were 
therefore available to Stevens falls just short of suggesting that Stevens should just simply know 
that such resources are available. 
Stevens does not suggest to this Court that City has the obligation to "hold his hand" and 
actually research the ordinances for an appropriate remedy or to act as an advocate in any way. 
Stevens simply suggests that pursuant to Worrall and Mullane. the City at least has an obligation 
to provide some form of information indicating that such ordinances and/or possible remedies 
exist.6 Otherwise, "[t]he right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that 
6
 Pursuant to Worrall, the City would be obligated to provide a letter to Stevens 
containing a notice of his right to a hearing and the time limitation on this right. Id at 602 
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the matter [affecting one's property rights] is pending and can choose for himself whether to 
appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Mullane at 314. 
Thus, as City failed to impart to Stevens any form of information regarding his right to 
appeal the City's actions, Stevens' due process rights have been violated. As a result, Stevens did 
not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies. As Stevens did not fail to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, summary judgment in favor of City was in error and should be reversed. 
IV. T H E TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO GIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 
GROUNDS FOR ITS ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
When a court decides a motion for summary judgment, rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that "[t]he court shall. . . issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision... when the motion is based on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Failure 
of a trial court to give a written statement of grounds for its order granting summary judgment, 
where the motion for summary judgment was based on more than one ground, can be a 
reversible error in some circumstances. (Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain 
States, Inc.. 844 P.2d 949, 958 n.4 (Utah 1992); Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 
1989)). 
The brief written statement must allow the appellate court to determine which of the 
grounds a trial court relied upon in making its ruling. (Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT 
App 277, Tj 20, 34 P.3d 234). In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Utah Court of 
Appeals noted that "the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has 
little operative effect when we cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic 
nature of its ruling." (Id at f^lO). Because the Gabriel Court could not determine on which 
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ground advanced by the defendant city in its motion for summary judgment the trial court relied 
in making its decision, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
city was reversed. (TcL at 1J20). 
Just as the defendants in Gabriel City asserted multiple arguments in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 445-467). What is more, the instant action was before the trial court 
on Stevens' Verified Complaint, City's Counterclaim and injunctive motions filed by both 
parties. Similar to the district court's order in Gabriel the only statement included in the trial 
court's Order which granted summary judgment to City indicated that judgment was granted, 
"[b]ased on [the] Defendant City of LaVerkin's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff 
Robert C. Stevens and the Memorandum in Support of said Motion, and good cause appearing." 
(R. 511). 
Here the trial court simply failed to "explain the basis of their decisions when there are 
multiple issues before the court." See Russell/Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, 
n. 6, 78 P.3d 616. Inasmuch as the trial court did not provide an adequate written statement, 
it is unknown which facts were accepted by the trial court and on what basis the trial court relied 
on in granting summary judgment to City. This constitutes reversible error under Retherford 
and this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling. 
V. T H E DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
STEVENS' RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING 
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment. 
See Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). However, such discretion is not unlimited as 
the district court's ruling must be based on "adequate findings of fact" and "on the law/' See 
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Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277, 279 (Utah 2000). Furdiermore, judgment by default is an 
"extreme measure and a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits." (Id at ^ J63 
^quoting Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani 282 F.3d 1164,1169-70 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1983)). Here, there are genuine issues of fact and 
questions of law that need answering through a trial on the merits. 
A. Stevens provided sufficient evidence to establish excusable neglect under 
Rule 60(b)(1) so as to justify the setting aside the judgment. 
A party may obtain relief from a judgment if he can demonstrate "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect." (Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)). Excusable neglect as been defined 
as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." 
(Mini Spas, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987)). In Black's Tide Inc. v. 
State Ins. Dept . 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct App. 1999), the Black's Tide court clarified the meaning 
of "due diligence" by stating that, "to demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, 
'the movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control.'" Quoting Airkem Intermountain. Inc v. Parker, 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973) (underlined added). 
In the present case, Stevens' former counsel exercised due diligence and but for 
circumstances beyond his control, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment would have been timely filed. The instant case is the very sort of case 
to which the rule was intended to apply. 
As a result of the inherent confusion in the remodel and relocation of offices, in addition 
to hiring a new secretary, Stevens' former counsel failed to timely file the opposition 
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memorandum. This is not a case of Stevens5 former counsel just facing cc[r]outine back-office 
problems..." (Appellee's Br. at 45 quoting Pretzel & Stouffer v. Imperial Adjusters. Inc.. 28 F.3d 
42, 46 (7th Cir. 1994)). By circumstances beyond their control, of which anyone who has moved 
offices or homes has experienced, Stevens' former counsel failed to timely respond to City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, under the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect standard of rule 60(b)(1), the Order Granting Summary Judgment should have 
been set aside. 
B. Stevens is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
When an attorney willfully disregards a client's interests, acts in a grossly negligent 
fashion, or renders ineffective assistance of counsel, Rule 60(b)(6) is applicable, and an 
unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a default judgment resulting from an 
attorney's grossly negligent conduct. (See, e.g., Menzies, 2006 UT 81, \ll\ Shepard Claims Serv., 
Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs.. 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[Although a party who 
chooses an attorney takes the risk of suffering from the attorney's incompetence, we do not 
believe . . . a client should suffer the ultimate sanction of losing his case without any 
consideration of the merits because of his attorney's neglect and inattention."); L.P. Steuart Inc. 
v. Matthews. 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that the client was entided to relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6), because the case defaulted as a result of die counsel's gross negligence and 
misleading of the client)). 
In the present case, whether the actions of Stevens' former counsel were "deplorable" 
or not, they do form the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (Appellee Br. at 47). Simply stated, 
Stevens' former counsel failed to notify Stevens of the pending Motion for Summary Judgment 
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and failed to respond to die Muuuii :n a \u\nA\ manner. If this Court refuses to grant relief 
i inderE i ile 60(b)(1), this Coi i rtshoi ild at least grant relief to Stevens i inderK i lie 60(b)(6) Again, 
this is the very situation to which the rule was intended to apply. 
If the judicial system were to u< >^\ a litigant i;adn„ u. -•- h a case for the actions of the 
attorney , the ji idicia 1 system woi ikl lose cred ihtl ity arid, fai rness E e] ief i mder R ule 61 )(b)(6) 
constitutes a mechanism by which Stevens can obtain fill1 relief from his former counsel's 
negligence. Based on the principles articulated above, the ruling of the lower court denying 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b; Motion LO Set Aside ilu h . hment should be reversed. 
VI . R U L E 60(B) M O T I O N S ARE D I S P O S I T I V E M O T I O N S R E Q U I R I N G A 
H E A R I X C I ' N D K K Rf I E 7(e). 
1 ) i! jR i tie 60(b) M< )ti( m tc » Set ^ side 
the Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment. ( R. 632). The Utah 
Rules oi »' .i\ii 1}roc.Mure p rov ide ihat courts "snail b;rant a request for a hearing on .. . amotion 
tha t w o ' .d '" p-»^ - • *i'« •  T • '* - •• .::• < • d . •• • •< i n t h e a * : * !<•- ] : ->i,r • r !• 'ii.it 
the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decide o . i Ui: K ,,., . . • 'ontrary to ( ,uy s u n alar argument, the language ot ,\\.ik. 7 
does not differentiate between whether the disposal need be through the ^ranting of the motion 
or the denial of the motion. 
I iere, the dei :i ia 1 of Stevens' 6( )(b) I\ lotion d isposes of the action under R ule 7 1 n as 
much as Stevens' Rule 60(b) Motion satisfies die Rule 7(e) requirements, there was no reasonable 
basis for the denial of Stevens3 Rule 60(b) Motion without providing Stevens the hearing he had 
requested pursuant to R I lie / „ . . • 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and in the interests of justice, Stevens respectfully requests 
that the Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Order 
Dismissing Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment be reversed. 
DATED this / ? d a y of November, 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
FARMS & XJru&ffpTT 
ChadJ.Utley 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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